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ANALYSIS:
THE HOUSE INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE RESPONSE TO THE WEBB ALLEGATIONS
The following excerpt is Chapter IV of
Drugs, Contras and the CIA: Government Policies and the Cocaine Economy:
An Analysis of Media and Government Response to the Gary Webb Stories
in The San Jose Mercury News (1996-2000), by Peter Dale Scott, available
exclusively at the COPvCIA STORE.
Chapter Four. The Response By Congress
In February 2000 the House Permanent Select
Committee on Intelligence issued its own Report on the charges first
brought forward by Gary Webb’s stories in the San Jose Mercury
News. The Committee conducted its own interviews to supplement its review
of the two CIA IG Reports (Hitz I and II) and the DOJ IG Report. The
Committee claimed to have used Webb’s own articles and his book,
Dark Alliance as “key resources” in focusing and refining
their investigation (HR 2).
This Report represents a further episode
in the on-going national debate stirred up by Gary Webb’s stories,
rather than a useful resolution of that debate. Webb polarized this
country into two outraged factions, an elite faction offended by Webb’s
references to the CIA, and a public infuriated by Webb’s revelations
of government favors to major drug dealers.
The House Committee [HPSCI], to no one’s
surprise, has once again revealed its allegiance to the first faction.
It barely addresses what Webb actually wrote, and misrepresents even
the few sentences from which it quotes. Instead it focuses, over and
over, on what it calls the “implications of the San Jose Mercury
News” (HR 5), or “the government conspiracy theories implicit
in the 'Dark Alliance' series” (HR 5). Although the Report contains
a few valid criticisms, its major arguments are flawed by misrepresentations
and systematic falsehoods.
MISREPRESENTATIONS:
Here is the Committee’s version of
what Webb wrote:Among other things, the series stated that CIA assets
were responsible, during the 1980’s, for supplying cocaine to South
Central Los Angeles. The cocaine operation, according to the articles,
was part [sic] of the Nicaraguan Democratic Force (FDN), and it was
masterminded by CIA assets who were using the sale of this cocaine to
finance the Contra movement. The articles stated that these individuals
met with “CIA agents both before and during the time they were
selling the drugs in L.A.” (HR 6)
A Committee footnote to the last sentence
adds, erroneously, that “From the context in which the term ‘agent’
is used, it is apparently meant to refer to CIA staff employees.”
The Report then shifts from Webb’s
alleged statements to what he “suggested:" Although the articles
did not specifically state that the CIA was directly involved in cocaine
trafficking, the series suggested that the CIA condoned the trafficking.
For this “implication” the Report
musters one credible piece of evidence:
For months the San Jose Mercury’s internet
web page introduced the articles with a title page that presented an
individual lighting a crack cocaine pipe superimposed over the official
seal of the CIA, clearly demonstrating an intent to link the CIA with
cocaine trafficking. (HR 6)
This bit of web sensationalism was indeed
responsible for much of the furor in response to Webb’s articles.
The San Jose Mercury News was right to withdraw it. But, as the Committee
should have known, the web logo was not part of the series; and Gary
Webb in particular had nothing to do with it.
The Report’s one effort to quote the
Report itself is blatantly illogical. “The articles left readers
with the impression that the CIA was responsible for the spread of cocaine
in South Central Los Angeles,” it argues (HR 43), and then supports
this claim with a citation from Gary Webb whose statement about the
CIA is quite different:
For the better part of a decade, a San Francisco
Bay Area drug ring sold tons of cocaine to the Crips and Bloods street
gangs of Los Angeles and funneled millions in drug profits to a Latin
American guerrilla army run by the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency,
a Mercury News investigation has found.
One can question whether the cocaine amounted
to “tons;” one can question whether the profits amounted to
“millions;” one can even question (and the Report does, vigorously)
whether the Contras amounted to an “army.” But the connections
presented in this sentence have been validated by the DOJ investigation,
which found that the two main dealers, Norwin Meneses and Danilo Blandon,
were, as the Report concedes, “significant dealers who supported
the Contras” (HR 11). The DOJ also corroborated Webb’s
claim that the government knew of the two men’s drug trafficking,
but never moved against them until after the Contra program ended.
Nothing in Webb’s sentence, or any
other part of Webb’s stories, stated or implied that either Meneses
or Blandon were themselves “CIA agents” or “CIA assets.”
The only people named as “CIA agents” (Webb never used the
term “assets”) were the Contras’ military chief Enrique
Bermudez, and the Contra political leaders Adolfo Calero (who Webb called
a “CIA operative”) and Marcos Aguado.
Elsewhere I have faulted Webb for using
the term “CIA agent” too loosely. Enrique Bermudez is
not known to have been a “CIA agent” (as opposed to “CIA
asset,” “client,” or “invention”). But Aguado
has been said in sworn testimony to have presented himself as a CIA
agent (Scott and Marshall 113). Calero, by most informed accounts, was
a long-time CIA agent.
Webb was unambiguously referring to Bermudez
and Calero when he claimed that Meneses and Blandon “met with CIA
agents both before and during the time they were selling the drugs in
L.A.” And unquestionably they did. Blandon confirmed to the Committee
what Webb had claimed: that in 1981 he and Meneses met Bermudez in Honduras,
and that Bermudez had urged the two men (at this time only Meneses was
a prominent drug dealer) to support the Contras, adding that “the
end justifies the means.” Blandon disputed only Webb’s interpretation
that Bermudez was sanctioning a drug traffic: “It didn’t mean
that he told us, go on, sell drugs” (HR 26). (Meneses denied that
Bermudez used the phrase at all, but confirmed that Bermudez gave him
“instructions about generating support for the Contra cause;”
HR 22.)
It is equally certain that both Meneses
and Blandon met with Adolfo Calero. Webb documented this with a photograph
of Meneses and Calero together, The Report claims that Webb presented
the photo “as evidence that there was an association between the
CIA and drug trafficking,” and it calls “this type of ‘proof’...fallacious”
(HR 3). What nonsense! Webb presented the photo as evidence that Calero
and Meneses met.
Webb reported the eyewitness account of
a former Contra supporter, “David Morrison,” that Calero and
Meneses met frequently; and also that (as “Morrison” told
the FBI in 1987) Calero’s FDN faction of the Contras had “become
more involved in selling arms and cocaine for personal gain than in
a military effort.”
“Morrison” tipped Webb to his
central allegation, that (in the Committee’s words) “attempts
by law enforcement entities to investigate and prosecute...Meneses...were
‘stymied’ by ‘agencies of the U.S. government’”
as long as the Contras were in existence (HR 6).
Amazingly, the Committee does not address
this claim in their Findings, presumably because they knew it was correct.
The DOJ confirmed that Meneses was investigated but never arrested on
drug charges from 1980 to 1989; and even (as Webb had noted) that “Meneses
was able to enter the United States repeatedly, despite the various
investigations of him for drug trafficking” (DOJ 187). The Committee
virtually suppresses this corroboration in its summary of the DOJ Inspector-General’s
Report, saying merely that “there was uncertainty within the DOJ
concerning whether to prosecute Meneses or use him as a witness in other
cases” (HR 11). This is a very tepid way of acknowledging
that a well-known and “significant” drug dealer moved freely
without fear of arrest.
FALSEHOODS:
The Committee’s determination to exonerate
the government and invalidate Webb leads them to make a number of statements
that can only be called falsehoods. These falsehoods are not random.
On the contrary, they add up to a coherent but false picture that has
been the CIA’s fallback account of Contra drug trafficking since
1985. In sum, the Committee tries to corroborate the claim of CIA Task
Force Chief Alan Fiers, testifying in 1986, that “there was a lot
of cocaine trafficking around Eden
Pastora...None around FDN, none around UNO”—the
successive names for the Bermudez-Calero faction of the Contras (HR
213; cf. Hitz II, para 242).(The Independent Counsel for Iran-Contra
concluded that Fiers had committed perjury in other statements which
he made to Congress. Fiers pleaded guilty to two lesser counts; Walsh
263.)
Falsehood #1: The FDN Leadership Avoided
Drug-Trafficking:
In the Committee’s words, there is
unambiguous reporting in the CIA materials reviewed showing that the
FDN leadership in Nicaragua would not accept drug monies and would remove
from its ranks those who had involvement in drug trafficking. (HR 44n)
A more honest summary of the Hitz reports
would acknowledge that they contained a detailed account of drug-trafficking
by members of the main FDN faction, ADREN, alias the 15th of September
Legion. Those named included the FDN Chief of Logistics (Hitz II, paras
181, 187, 194, 542). Hitz I reports that a key figure in the so-called
“Frogman” drug case claimed to have personally delivered drug
profits to FDN leader Aristides Sanchez, saying that the money was from
Aristides’ brother Troilo—a known drug-trafficker and source
for the “Frogman” cocaine (Hitz I, para 270).
The Committee received, and even reprinted,
the Hitz II Summary finding that “CIA also received allegations
or information concerning drug trafficking by nine Contra-related individuals
in the [FDN] Northern Front, based in Honduras” (Hitz II Summary
para 17; HR 169). This included credible information, corroborated elsewhere,
against Adolfo Calero’s brother Mario Calero, the chief purchasing
agent, and Juan Ramon Rivas, the Northern Army Chief of Staff (Hitz
II, paras 550-52, 560-72).
A CIA HQ cable in November 1986 described
Mario Calero as “a symbol to our critics of all that is perceived
to be rotten in the FDN” (Hitz II, para 557). At this time there
was a statutory requirement to cut off “funding to any Contra group
that retained a member who ‘has been found’ to engage in drug
smuggling” (Hitz II Summary, para 33; HR 175).
Falsehood #2: The Kerry Senate Subcommittee
found that the U.S. Government cut off aid to Pastora’s faction,
because of its involvement in drug-trafficking.
Let us quote the Committee exactly on this
false claim, which is central to their overall argument:
The [Kerry] Subcommittee...noted that all
U.S. assistance to the [Pastora] Southern Front Contra organization
(ARDE) was cut off on May 30, 1984 because of the involvement of ARDE
personnel in drug trafficking.
As we shall see, this is a double falsehood.
The May 1984 cutoff of aid to Pastora was not because of drug trafficking,
and the Kerry Committee never “noted” that it was.
If we turn to the page in the Kerry Report
cited by the House Committee, we find the following:
After the La Penca bombing of May 30, 1984,
all assistance was cut off by the CIA to ARDE, while other Contra groups
on both fronts continued to receive support from the U.S. government
through a variety of channels. The United States stated that its
cut-off of ARDE was related to the involvement of its personnel in drug
trafficking. Yet many of the same drug traffickers who had assisted
ARDE were also assisting other Contra groups that continued to receive
funding. Morales, for example, used Geraldo [sic] Duran as one of his
drug pilots, and Duran worked for Alfonso Robelo and Fernando “el
Negro” Chamorro, who were associated with other Contra groups”
[i.e. the Calero-Bermudez faction] (Kerry Report, 52).
In other words, the Kerry Report discredited
the government claim that aid to Pastora was cut off in May 1984 because
of drug trafficking. In fact, the Report went on the repeat the claim
of a Pastora aide, Karol Prado, that the CIA was manipulating drug trafficking
allegations to discredit Pastora and his supporters. The Report then
supported this claim with an entry from Oliver North’s diary (7/24/84),
“get Alfredo Cesar on Drugs” (Kerry Report, 53).
Prado’s claim has been endorsed by
a number of books (e.g. Honey 365, Scott para 82). It was repeated to
the House Committee by Pastora himself (HR 21-22).However
the Committee found no evidence to support
Pastora’s claims....On the contrary, interviews with CIA officials
and a review of the CIA’s operational correspondence from that
period reveal that the CIA began to distance itself from Pastora and
his organization because it had received information that Pastora and
members of his group were involved with drug trafficking.” (HR
22)
What the CIA officials told the Committee
is demonstrably untrue. Aid to Pastora was cut off “in May 1984”
(HR 21), after Pastora had rejected a CIA ultimatum to merge his organization
with the FDN led by Bermudez and Calero. The relevant allegations of
drug trafficking around Pastora date from after, not before, this cutoff.
Joe Fernandez, the former CIA Station Chief in Costa Rica, told the
HPSCI that
CIA immediately sought to sever its relationship
with Pastora when it was determined that Morales was involved in narcotics
trafficking and that Pastora had access to some of Morales’ illicit
funds. (HR 19)
But this determination was made in October
1984, four months after the aid cutoff. In the words of Hitz II,
The cutoff of U.S. funding led associates
of Pastora to begin looking for alternative sources of funds. In October
1984, CIA began receiving the reporting mentioned earlier that Southern
Front leaders allied with Pastora had agreed to help Miami-based trafficker
Jorge Morales bring drugs into the United States in exchange for his
material and financial help to the Southern Front. (Hitz II, para 221;
cf. para 225)
The CIA made a final termination of its
relationship with Pastora two weeks later, completing the break that
began with the aid cutoff in May (Hitz II, para 232).
The Hitz II chronology, though enough to
disprove the claim that drug allegations led to the aid cutoff, does
not tell the full story. According to the Kerry Report, Morales’
financial help also went to former associates of Pastora (like Fernando
Chamorro and Alfonso Robelo) who under CIA pressure had defected from
Pastora and joined with the FDN in a new, allegedly united UNO.
Thus the CIA use of the Morales story is
duplicitous. They used the Morales connection to discredit Pastora,
both at the time and later to the House Committee. Yet the CIA, even
though it was getting reports on the Morales operation from Morales’
two top Contra contacts, never reported to anyone about the connections
of Morales and his pilot Duran to those (like Fernando Chamorro and
Alfonso Robelo) in its preferred UNO faction.
Hitz II corroborates that Adolfo “Popo”
Chamorro and Octaviano Cesar, the two Contra leaders receiving funds
from Morales until 1986, had by then broken with Pastora and joined
a rival faction, the CIA-preferred BOS (Hitz II, paras 245, 331). Hitz
II also reveals that a source for the October 1984 drug accusations
against Pastora, Harold Martinez, left Pastora for the BOS, where he
was later identified as a drug trafficker (Hitz II, paras 424-25). Even
the tepid Hitz II summary confirms that whereas the CIA broke off contact
with Pastora in October 1984, it “continued to have contact through
1986-87 with four of the individuals involved with Morales”—i.e.
with Chamorro and Cesar (Hitz II Summary, para 14; HR 168-69).
The relative candor of Hitz II is wholly
suppressed in the House Committee Report, which reverts to the 1980s
cover story:
Several senior CIA managers [interviewed
by the Committee] could recollect only a single instance of narco-trafficking
by Contra officials....based on these reports, CIA program managers
severed U.S. support to this Contra faction [i.e. Pastora’s]
(HR 42).
It is possible that the Committee did hear
this falsehood, but that is no excuse for transmitting it.
The Committee did interview Adolfo “Popo”
Chamorro, who readily admitted his involvement with the confessed drug
trafficker George Morales (HR 24). Chamorro told the Committee “that
his cousin, Octaviano Cesar [widely reported from other sources to have
been a CIA agent; Scott and Marshall 113] asked permission from the
CIA to proceed with an operation involving Morales” [i.e. the drug
operation]” (HR 24).
It is highly revealing of the Committee’s
aims and method that, after hearing that Cesar had requested CIA permission
before proceeding in an operation with a drug dealer, it did not interview
Cesar. (Cesar had earlier reported to the Kerry Committee that he reported
to CIA about his deal with Morales, and Hitz II [para 332] confirms
that Cesar gave a full account of it to CIA Security.)
This is a matter of the greatest seriousness.
A US government witness, Fabio Carrasco (one of Morales’ pilots)
gave sworn testimony that on instructions from Jorge Morales he personally
delivered “several million dollars” in 1984-85 to Southern
front Contra leaders Octaviano Cesar and Adolfo “Popo” Chamorro
(NSA Packet [47]). This represented payment for “between five and
seven” drug
shipments under the Morales-Chamorro deal,
amounting in all to between 1,500 and 2,800 kilos of cocaine; p. [51].
Carrasco and another pilot testified that
they understood the flights had CIA protection, and it is clear that
they were able to fly into customs-controlled airports without interference.
In addition Morales, just like Meneses, was able to enter and leave
the United States without difficulty, even though he was under indictment
for drug offenses at the time (Scott paras 78-92).
FALSEHOOD #3: CIA officers never concealed
narcotics trafficking.
This falsehood is so outrageous that, once
again, it should be quoted:
CIA reporting to DOJ of information on Contra
involvement in narcotics trafficking was inconsistent but in compliance
with then-current policies and regulations. There is no evidence, however,
that CIA officers in the field or at headquarters ever concealed narcotics
trafficking information or allegations involving the Contras. (HR 42)
In fact CIA officers did take steps to prevent
what the CIA knew about Contra drug-trafficking from reaching the DOJ.
In 1987 the Miami U.S. Attorney’s office was investigating drug
allegations concerning two Cuban Contra supporters, Felipe Vidal and
Moises Nunez, as well as their seafood company Ocean Hunter. When
a CIA officer proposed to debrief Vidal about these matters, he was
overruled, on the grounds that “narcotics trafficking relative
to Contra-related activities is exactly the sort of thing that the U.S.
Attorney’s Office will be investigating” (Hitz II, para 522).
A similar proposal to debrief Nunez was likewise overruled (Hitz II,
para 491).
The cover-up involved acts of commission
as well as omission. In July 1987 CIA lawyers transmitted a request
from the Miami U.S. Attorney’s office for “any documents”
concerning Contra-related activities of Ocean Hunter. The Department
of Operations advised the CIA lawyers that “no information had
been found regarding Ocean Hunter,” although such information existed
(Hitz II, para 528). Concerning the drug-suspected airline SETCO, owned
by Class One narcotics trafficker Juan Ramon Matta Ballesteros, and
used by CIA to supply FDN camps in Honduras, CIA officials reported
falsely, in response to an inquiry from Justice, that in CIA files “There
are no records of a SETCO Air.” CIA officers appear also to have
lied to Hitz investigators about this matter (Hitz II, paras 820-23).
This protection of drug traffickers expressed
itself in other ways as well. A CIA cable discouraged CIA counternarcotics
efforts against a major trafficker, Alan Hyde, on the grounds that Hyde’s
connection to CIA “is well documented and could prove difficult
in the prosecution stage” (Hitz II, para 953). CIA headquarters
gave orders that DEA Agents not pursue a drug investigation of a Contra
pilot that would have risked exposure of CIA Contra support operations
at Ilopango Airport(Hitz II, para 451).
The Committee appears to have been aware
that CIA officers did withhold information from Justice. What else can
explain the comically restricted language of its official Finding Number
Six:
CIA officers, on occasion, notified law
enforcement entities when they became aware of allegations concerning
the identities or activities of drug traffickers” (HR 44).
This seems to concede that “on occasion”
they did not. Such a finding is about as helpful as if the FBI, after
investigating a suspect, found that “on occasion” he was nice
to people.
One cannot agree with the Committee that
such withholding of information was “in compliance with then current
policies and regulations.” It is true that the Reagan Justice Department
had exempted CIA officers from the legal requirement to volunteer to
the DOJ what they knew about drug crimes. It did not however give
them permission to withhold information about drug crimes, or to lie
about them.
The Committee claims that narcotics trafficking
was not a high priority in the 1980s:
Narcotics trafficking today is arguably
our most important national security concern....This was not the case
during the Contra insurgency, and the CIA’s counternarcotics reporting
record from that time is mixed at best” (HR 38-39).
It is abundantly obvious that in the 1980s
narcotics trafficking was not an important national security concern
of the CIA. But in downplaying its importance, the CIA substituted its
own priorities for those of the nation. President Reagan himself, in
1986, signed a directive declaring drugs to be a national security threat
(Scott and Marshall 2). In a White House address, he also called on
the American people to join him in a national crusade against drugs
(Los Angeles Times, 8/5/86).
CONCLUSIONS:
The House Permanent Select Committee on
Intelligence Report is an important document, one deserving the attention
and close scrutiny of the American public. It is important for what
it tells us, not about the CIA, but about the Committee itself. The
Committee was originally created to exert Congressional checks and restraints
on the intelligence community, in accordance with the spirit of the
Constitution. For some time it has operated instead as a rubber stamp,
deflecting public concern rather than representing it. It is however
possible that never before has such a dishonest and deceptive
document, on such an important subject, been approved without dissent
by the full membership of the Committee.
What is particularly disappointing is that
the CIA and DOJ Inspector Generals’ Reports, although limited and
in some ways flawed, represented a new level of candor in admitting
that journalistic accounts of Contra drug-trafficking were grounded
in real problems. Rarely has the public waited so attentively
for a response from the HPSCI, just as perhaps never before had there
been so much interest in an HPSCI public hearing.
I am told that, at the public town hall
meetings in Los Angeles where Julian Dixon and other members of the
panel were present, the American people were promised open hearings.
In fact the one open hearing (on Hitz I) was held so suddenly that even
a concerned Congresswoman learned of it only after the hearing began.
The May 25, 1999 hearing on Hitz II and the DOJ Report was closed. Congress
should now be pressured to take steps to ensure that the promise of
an open hearing is fulfilled, preferably in another Committee.
For the HPSCI’s record on drug trafficking
by CIA assets has been constantly abysmal. We know now that in the 1980s
the Chairman of the HPSCI, Lee Hamilton, was regularly receiving reports
from the CIA about Contra-related drug trafficking (Hitz II, e.g. paras
237, 287, 308,1099). Yet, as Chair of the House Iran-Contra Committee,
Hamilton commissioned a staff memo which alleged, falsely and dishonestly,
that “reams of testimony from hundreds of witnesses...developed
no evidence which would show that Contra leadership was involved in
drug smuggling. (Iran-Contra Report, 631, Scott paras 178-87). Bill
McCollum, who as member of the HPSCI had also received such reports,
endorsed the lying memo. He is still an active member of the HPSCI.
This latest deception cannot be written
off as an academic or historical matter. The CIA’s practice of
recruiting drug-financed armies is an on-going matter. It appears to
have begun when Sicilian mafiosi, some of them freshly deported from
U.S. prisons, were used to attack and kill the Communists who threatened
to win an election in Sicily. Using Laotian hill people whose
sole cash crop was opium, the CIA recruited an entire army numbering
tens of thousands.
At the same time as the Contras, the CIA
was arming and advising heroin-trafficking guerrillas in Afghanistan.
Its preferred leader, Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, became for a period one of
the leading heroin suppliers in the world. In the last few years, the
CIA has helped promote the Kosovo Liberation Army, many of whose leaders
and arms are known to have been financed by Kosovar drug-trafficking.
No one can pretend that these practices
have not contributed to our national drug crisis. In 1979, when the
U.S. first established contact with heroin-trafficking guerrillas in
Afghanistan, no heroin from the so-called Golden Crescent on the Afghan-Pakistan
border was known to reach the United States. By 1984, according to the
Reagan Administration, 54 percent of the heroin reaching this country
came from the Afghan-Pakistan border.
The CIA’s drug scandals are not confined
to its allegedly unmanageable guerrilla armies. In March 1997
Michel-Joseph Francois, the CIA-backed police chief in Haiti, was indicted
in Miami for having helped to smuggle 33 tons of Colombian cocaine and
heroin into the United States. The Haitian National Intelligence Service
(SIN), which the CIA helped to create, was also a target of the Justice
Department investigation which led to the indictment. (San Francisco
Chronicle, 3/8/97). A few months earlier, General Ramon Guillen Davila,
chief of a CIA-created anti-drug unit in Venezuela, was indicted in
Miami for smuggling a ton of cocaine into the United States. According
to the New York Times, “The CIA, over the objections of the Drug
Enforcement Administration, approved the shipment of at least one ton
of pure cocaine to Miami International Airport as a way of gathering
information about the Colombian drug cartels.” (New York Times,
11/3/96). The total amount of drugs smuggled by Gen. Guillen may have
been more than 22 tons.
So the HPSCI Report should be taken as an
occasion for both Congressional and national action. Reforms of the
Intelligence Committees are urgently needed, to create greater space
between the Committee and the bodies they are supposed to oversee. (Porter
Goss, the current HPSCI chairman, is a former CIA officer, while George
Tenet, the current CIA Director, is a former member of the Senate Select
Committee on Intelligence staff.)
Porter Goss’s true agenda is revealed
by his selection in 1997 of another former CIA officer, John Millis,
to be Chief of the HPSCI Staff. In 1997 it was obvious that the HPSCI
would be called on to make an objective evaluation of the Gary Webb
allegations. However Millis had served for thirteen years as a case
officer supplying covert CIA aid to the heroin-trafficking guerrillas
in Afghanistan—an analogous and contemporary alliance between the
CIA and known drug-traffickers (New York Times, 6/6/00). At least one
of the airlines involved in the Afghan support operation, Global International
Airways, was also named in connection with the Iran-Contra scandal (Los
Angeles Times, 2/20/97).
The most immediate national priority should
be to demand an accounting for what happened from the present members
of the HPSCI. Their constituents should inform them and their personal
staffs of the reasons why this Report is unacceptable and should be
rejected.
[The full 50 page report, with index and
bibliography is available for $14.95 + 3.00 s&h at www.suppressedwriters.com]
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